Despite how Australia’s geographical advantages and willingness to employ strict containment policies have contributed to its relatively successful management of the 2019 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic: with 29,166 cases and 909 deaths confirmed as of March 2021 (World Health Organisation, n.d.), its influence on the Australian society remains undeniably profound. Many of the virus’ effects, for instance, have resulted in detrimental consequences on the Australian economy: including how the closure of borders and lockdowns have contributed to the end of Australia’s 29 years of uninterrupted economic growth (D’Souza, 2020; Lim et al., 2021); and how the country’s significant reduction in short term performances - including the 7.4% unemployment rate in June 2020 - can potentially hinder its long term development despite the prospect of recovery (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2021b). The vaccination campaign, in particular, has been among a set of policies intended by the Australian government to remedy the effects of COVID-19: with 164,437 people already vaccinated and 73% of the population expressing willingness to participate (ABS, 2021a; Australian Government Department of Health, n.d.; O’Sullivan et al., 2020). Yet regardless of the populace apparent consensus, many observers remain sceptical of the government’s decision to make vaccination voluntary, with some proposing the idea of imposing sanctions on non-compliant subjects to sustain the creation of herd immunity in Australia (Guerrera, 2020).
Intrigued by this ongoing debate, this analysis seeks to examine how mandatory vaccination can assist in the management of COVID-19. It starts by putting forward the notion that, employing Gary Becker’s economic axioms, mandatory vaccination can theoretically increase the vaccination rate through influencing the individual’s cost-benefit rationale. It then argues that, due to the absence of homogeneity in the real-world economy and unintended consequences, the extent of this approach’s practicality remains limited; and that there exist alternatives that the government can also employ to provide results necessary for Australia’s effective and sustainable recovery.
In order to effectively explain reasons that may incentivise the government’s adoption of the mandatory vaccination policy, the essay finds it necessary to identify how the decision to get vaccinated can include costs and benefits that are different between personal and societal levels. In particular, an individual is likely to base their decision on personal risks and opportunity costs involved: including monetary costs and inherent risks of side effects, to the benefit of acquiring COVID-19 immunity. Meanwhile, the government’s evaluation tends to focus upon social costs and benefits of vaccination: such as the benefit of increasing the national output level from more economic activities, in measuring the extent of the policy’s effectiveness. Accordingly, the government is likely to decide that more immunisation is necessary on the ground that marginal social benefits of increasing contribution to the economy far exceed the marginal social costs required - a conclusion which can become conflicted with individual choices and beliefs (Boettke & Powell, 2021; O’Sullivan et al. 2020).
Consequently, this dispute of interests allows for the use of Becker’s model to rationalise the government’s application of incentives to influence individuals’ decisions regarding the COVID-19 vaccination. Describing economic agents as operating in their self-interests to pursue maximum utility, Becker (as cited in Heckman, 2015) hypothesised that consumption would occur at the point of equilibrium where costs and benefits of the decision are equal. This rationalisation in return becomes especially relevant within the context of the voluntary vaccination, as individuals who consider themselves economically satisfied are likely to abstain from the programme: a decision which is highly undesirable for the government as it reduces the capacity for national immunity to be effectively established (Boettke & Powell, 2021). Hence the notion that consumers tend to disregard the external effects of their decisions can help justify the government’s adoption of the mandatory vaccination policy, as the widespread access to vaccines and enforcement by the State can coerce people into vaccinating under threats of community pressure and public sanctions.
In addition to how the criminalisation of non-vaccinated individuals can influence the consumers’ behaviour, the imposition of penalties such as fines and restriction from public services can also help coerce people into vaccinating by causing the increase in costs of their choices. Once again the Becker’s paradox can be used in explaining this phenomenon as, thanks to how criminal activities can be considered as a form of rational economic decisions, individuals are unlikely to commit a crime if the costs of getting caught exceed the utility from committing such offence and getting away (Persson & Siven, 2007). This adherence of consumers toward the cost-benefit rationale thus allows the use of mandatory vaccination to reinforce the management of COVID-19, since sufficiently harsh punishments are likely to deter the population from defying the public regulation and ensure compliance to the immunisation campaign.
Nevertheless, while it is possible to argue that mandatory vaccination can rectify the vaccines’ wasted positive externalities, the policy’s prescriptive nature can also lead to consequences that can offset the extent of its effectiveness. This notion becomes evident when considering that, similar to how the effects of COVID-19 appear to be more profound in demographics with lower socioeconomic standing (O’Sullivan et al., 2020), the policy’s unilateral approach may result in unintentional discrimination towards social groups - namely Aboriginal Australians - whose limited economic opportunities can prevent them from participating in the programme. Furthermore, the adoption of discriminatory policies in assisting the management of the mandatory vaccination can be detrimental to the trust in government, as the act of forcing the populace into vaccinating without regards to the vaccines’ risks and effects - both of which contribute to 74% of reasons Australians may decide not to get vaccinated (ABS, 2021a) - can be considered as the violation of human rights and thus provide incentives for potential social unrests in the long run: as evidenced by examples of public demonstration in Melbourne following the government’s facemask mandate, along with the Amnesty International’s condemnation of the Indonesian government following its decision to designate non-vaccination as a criminal offence (Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.; Hamid, 2021; McPhee, 2021).
Ultimately, while the government may possess valid incentives to employ mandatory vaccination in the management of COVID-19, its inflexibility and vulnerability to unintended consequences imply that it should only be used as a last resort. Nevertheless, this essay also recognises that the policy consideration of cost-benefit rationale also opens up the opportunity for the government to employ other alternatives - namely increasing engagement with the public and reducing the vaccination costs through welfare support - that can assist in reducing the externality of vaccination and offer means for the pandemic management and the adjustment to the post-COVID-19 world.
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