‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) : Syria case
Panwa
Nilprapunt
Introduction
For the past eleven years, the Syrian civil war and its
consequences have been among the worst crises of the twenty-first century.
Beginning in March 2011 as a part of the Arab Spring, the war has since turned
into a series of sporadic conflicts between the armies under President Bashir
Al-Assad, their oppositions, Islamist groups, and various foreign forces in battlefields
across Syria and neighbouring countries. Given its scale and duration, the
impacts of war have been staggering: with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees identifying 5.6 million Syrian refugees while also estimating that
83 civilians have been killed daily since 2011 ([UNCHR] 2022, n.d.);
additionally, over 14.6 million Syrians are also in need of assistance,
according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ([UNOCHA]
n.d.). And yet, the lack of international intervention to end the conflict also
puts to question the integrity of the principle of Responsibility to Protect
(R2P), with many observers seeing the war as marking the ‘death’ of the R2P
(Al-Oraibi 2021; Nasser-Eddine 2012). With events such as the Ukraine war
representing the emergence of conflicts worldwide, the failure of the R2P to
address the humanitarian disaster in Syria is becoming more relevant than ever.
Accordingly, this essay will examine the factors that
inhibit the effectiveness of the R2P in resolving the Syrian conflict and its
viability in the changing global order. To this end, it will begin by first
establishing what R2P and its core components are, with references to the
mainstream International Relations (IR) theories such as Liberalism, Realism
and Constructivism, prior to comparing it to the empirical context. Through
this process, it argues that in addition to issues specific to Syria, the
doctrine’s effectiveness is also hindered by the distrust stemming from its
historic ambiguities concerning the use of forces and regime change. These
findings thus lead the essay to conclude that R2P itself faces many caveats and
that, unless rigorous efforts are made to address the existing limitations, its
prospect as a global norm remains grim.
What is
R2P? An appraisal
The history
and components of the R2P
While the peacekeeping operation may have long been an
apparatus of the United Nations, the R2P is a relatively new concept. Driven by
atrocities committed in places like the Balkans and Rwanda, a trend began to
emerge in the 1990s on the need to focus on human security. This culminated in
the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (‘the Commission’) which, in the words of Constructivist IR
theorists, marked the moment R2P ‘entered the ‘norm-life cycle’’ (Ralph 2018,
p. 17). In it, the Commission assigned
states the ‘responsibility to protect’ their citizens from atrocities while
also stating that the international community has the obligation to intervene
if they fail to do so (Chandler 2004; ICISS 2001). The endorsement of the
Commission’s suggestions during the 2005 World Summit Outcome (WSO) thus
resulted in the formal recognition of the R2P, whilst subsequent UN resolutions
and publications also cemented its position as a tool to address humanitarian
issues (Bellamy & Williams 2011).
Consequently, the observation of the history of the R2P
helps us discern its core elements and how it is supposed to function. In
particular, the Commission and the WSO identified four types of atrocities that
would necessitate its mobilisation, namely genocide, war crime, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity (ICISS 2001; United Nations General
Assembly [UNGA] 2005, p. 30). Previous UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also outlined
in his report three pillars of the doctrine: including the duty of states to
safeguard their people from atrocities; the need for the international
community to assist in state-building; and the rights to intervene, which are
similar to the Commission’s proposals (UNGA 2009, p. 2). Nevertheless, Basaran
(2014, p. 195) also finds that measures of the R2P are varied, ranging from
issuing warnings to the application of military force, with the UN Security
Council deciding when and how to use it. Given its objective, this essay will
put an emphasis on the third pillar, the responsibility to intervene, in
explaining how the failure to impose it led to the R2P’s downfall in Syria.
R2P in the
literature: The debates
Despite its recency, R2P has been extensively studied; yet
the survey of the literature also reveals that its efficacy remains a divisive
topic. On the one hand, advocates of the R2P generally view its integration
into the UN’s framework with optimism. These include Evans (2012), who sees the
intervention in Libya as representing its emergence as a global norm; Bellamy
(2015), who hopes that its deployments can build consensus on its application;
and Thakur (2015, p. 13), who describes the R2P as promoting ‘international
solidarity’. Conversely, Heinze and
Steele (2013) view the doctrine’s success in formulating a universal approach
to atrocity crimes as nonetheless limited; whilst Hehir (2013) cites the cases
of selective interventionism since the 1990s as the evidence of R2P’s
incoherency and detachment from the realities of humanitarian intervention.
Meanwhile, some studies have taken to identifying structural problems that they
see as limiting the R2P’s effectiveness, though they also object to the idea
that the concept is doomed to fail (Paris 2014).
Given the myriad of opinions, the use of IR theories is
likely to help better our understanding of the views concerning the R2P. In the
first place, the R2P’s foundation highlights its roots in Liberalism, with the
Commission stating that their idea is, in the words of Chandler (2004, p. 62):
‘not based on power of Realpolitik, but morality’. This notion is further
reinforced by supporters of the R2P, whose arguments about the role of states
as moral agents also reflect the Liberalist belief in the international order
and its rights to intervene in addressing global challenges such as human
security (Chandler 2004; Doyle 2011). By comparison, several R2P critics and
their focus on the conflict between sovereignty and interventionism represent a
realist view of international relations which, according to Basaran (2014), see
national interests as more important to states than humanitarian concerns. Alternatively, some academics’ view of R2P
also reflects the Constructivist IR approach, which perceives its development
as demonstrating how the acceptance or rejection of norms can influence their
implementation in international politics (Ralph 2018). The following section of
this essay will therefore assess the extent these IR perspectives correspond to
the reality in Syria.
R2P in
Syria: An empirical assessment
In order to understand why R2P has failed in Syria, it is
necessary to examine the occasion where it was effectively endorsed; the 2011
intervention in Libya, for instance, represents the most well-known application
of the doctrine. Analysing the events preluding the decision to intervene via
Resolution 1973, Bellamy and Williams (2011) found that there was already a
clear threat of atrocities, with Gaddafi describing his plan to exterminate the
people in the rebel-held cities ‘like cockroaches’ (Barker 2011). Many
researchers also reveal how Libya’s geopolitical context was also suitable, as
its isolation from other Arabs states and the international community helped
eliminate any ties that could have prevented collective actions (Zifcak 2012).
Additionally, they also found that the adoption of Resolution 1973 was possible
only due to the consensus between the regional actors and the Council members
that intervention was necessary, with Russia and China opting to abstain (Paris
2014; Zifcak 2012). Thus the experiences from the Libyan intervention show that
certain conditions must be satisfied to justify the use of R2P.
Consequently, the observation of what helped R2P to succeed
in Libya also explains why it has failed in Syria, as many of the prerequisites
are either absent or rendered inoperable due to various geopolitical reasons.
Chief among them is the split within the UNSC, with Russia and China have been
vetoing every proposal to employ military intervention since the beginning of
the conflict in 2011, much to the dismay of Western observers (Akbarzadeh &
Saba 2019). This divide becomes especially relevant when considering the
Council members’ interests within the region: including Russia whose possession
of a naval base in Syria and status as the country’s major weapon supplier influence
its decision to recognise the Assad regime while also rejecting any call for
its dissolution (Averre & Davies 2015; Bellamy 2022; Treisman 2012). Syria's
capable militaries and deep ties to the politics of the Middle East, moreover,
also prevent regional actors: including organisations such as the Arab League
and its neighbours like Turkey and Iran, from leading an effort to stop the
conflict and subsequently inhibit actions from the wider global community
(Evans 2012; Lynch 2012). Hence the presence of these underlying elements adds
credence to the realist criticisms that national interests can prevent the R2P from
achieving its intended purposes.
Apart from geopolitics, the conflicting views on the
ambiguity of the R2P and its limits also appear to be driving the reluctance to
employ it in Syria. Specifically, many observers – including even advocates of
the R2P – have noted how previous applications of the doctrine have resulted in
regime change and excessive collateral damages, with civilian casualties from
NATO’s bombing in Libya and domestic instability following the fall of the Gaddafi
regime serving as a particular example (Evans 2012; Paris 2014; Zifcak 2012).
These issues have led states in the Global South to question its motives:
including the former president of South Africa who reversed his country’s
support of Resolution 1973 (Mbeki 2011); similarly, China and Russia have also
stated their objections against the use of R2P to challenge territorial
sovereignty and trigger regime changes in fear of repeating the events in Libya
(Akbarzadeh & Saba 2019; Averre & Davies 2015; Gegout & Suzuki
2020). On the other hand, supporters of the R2P in the Global North are also
responsible for confirming this suspicion by declaring government transition as
a part of the R2P, including the demand by the United States for Assad’s
resignation (Ukman & Sly 2011). Hence this inconsistency in how R2P should
be applied and its consequences, argued Paris (2014), makes the concept appear
hypocritical and unsuitable for real-world practices.
In general, the analysis of the causes behind R2P’s failure
in Syria shows that, despite its optimism, the doctrine itself remains a
practically flawed concept. The fact that geopolitics has acted to alter and
constrain the course of the R2P, for instance, undermines the hope that its
application would be enforced by international institutions and civil society,
whose powers have failed to prevent states from prioritising their national
interests over the prevention of atrocities. In the meantime, the way R2P’s
implementation is obstructed by its divisive definitions also limits its
progress in being accepted in spite of its early success. Adding to these
issues are the limited circumstances that can justify the R2P’s mobilisation,
with the lack of threat of atrocities by the regime having prevented the
concept from being invoked during the early stage of the conflict (Zifcak
2012). Put simply, the Syrian war provides ample testimonies of R2P’s
weaknesses as a global norm, with the international community’s inability to
organise effective responses even after the use of chemical weapons by the
Assad government only serves to confirm its ineffectiveness (Akbarzadeh &
Saba 2019; Nahlawi
2016).
Conclusion
In order to evaluate the success of R2P as a global norm, this
essay has been employing relevant theories and case studies from Syria to
determine the doctrine’s capacity to stop and prevent atrocities. However, what
emerges from its analysis appears to go against the expectations of both the
designers and well-wishers of the R2P. Instead, evidence suggests that the
concept – at least in its current iteration – suffers from inflexibility, ambiguity
in meanings, and other shortcomings that prevent it from realising its
potential while also damaging its reputation in the eyes of the global
community. Ultimately, unless multilateral efforts are made to lay out a widely
accepted definition and to strengthen its credibility, the ability of R2P to
address humanitarian issues and conflicts is likely to remain limited for the
foreseeable future.
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